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Brand Protection Online - Chapter "Switzerland"

Book Chapter
Mark Schweizer, Christoph Berchtold
Blum/Savvides (eds.), Brand Protection Online, London 2017, 271-285
Publication year: 2017

Brand Protection Online is a go-to guide for any user or adviser in need of strategies to combat IP infringement in the digital world or to get up to speed with the latest developments affecting brand holders online.

Online channels offer unprecedented growth opportunities for businesses. But as brands become increasingly accessible online, so too do they become more susceptible to trademark infringement, anti-competitive behaviour and hijacking by cybersquatters, phishers and scammers. With the potential to divert business, or even irreparably tarnish brand reputation, it is important that companies do everything in their power to protect against IP infringement online.

Featuring contributions from a host of leading experts in the field, this new and practically-focused title tackles the core issues of infringement and abuse online, analysing key trademark issues that businesses face on the Internet.

Nudging and the principle of proportionality: Obliged to nudge?

Book Chapter
Mark Schweizer
Mathis (Hrsg.), European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics, Heidelberg u.a. 2016, 93-119
Publication year: 2016

While the ethics and politics of nudging have received a great deal of attention, the legality of non-coercive interventions aimed at changing human behavior has received less attention. In this contribution, I examine firstly which limits, if any, the principle of proportionality (“Verhältnismäßigkeitsgrundsatz”) as applied by the German Federal Constitutional Court imposes on governmental “choice architects”. While nudges as such generally do not interfere with fundamental rights, including the very broad “right of personal development” of art. 2(1) Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany, their implementation will often interfere with the fundamental rights of citizens other than the decision makers and therefore trigger constitutional scrutiny. Since paternalistic motives are – in principle – not accepted as legitimate ends that may justify an interference with fundamental rights, nudges solely intended to protect the decision maker from self-harm may not pass the proportionality test. Secondly, I examine whether the necessity prong of the proportionality principle may force the legislator to choose a non-coercive nudge over a more traditional coercive measure. Given the empirical evidence of the limited effectiveness of nudges in changing behaviour compared to traditional regulatory means, I come to the conclusion that the proportionality principle does not compel the use of nudges.

Methodische Aspekte der gerichtlichen Schätzung ziffernmässig nicht nachweisbarer Forderungen gemäss Art. 42 Abs. 2 OR

Book Chapter
Mark Schweizer
Weber (Hrsg.), HAVE Personen-Schaden-Forum 2016, Zürich 2016, 163-188
Publication year: 2016

Einheit des Beweismaßes: Soll im Straf- und Zivilprozessrecht das gleiche Beweismaß gelten?

Book Chapter
Mark Schweizer
Effer-Uhe et al. (Hrsg.), Einheit der Prozessrechtswissenschaft? Tagung junger Prozessrechtswissenschaftler am 18./19. September 2015 in Köln, Stuttgart 2016, 341-362
Publication year: 2016

Dieser Beitrag untersucht, ob in Zivilsachen generell ein tieferes Beweismaß der „überwiegenden Überzeugung“ Anwendung finden soll. Die innere Begründung für ein Beweismaß der überwiegenden Überzeugung in Zivilsachen folgt aus der normativen Entscheidungstheorie, gemäß der sich die Entscheidungsgrenze nach den relativen Fehlerkosten bestimmt. Da diese nach hier vertretener Auffassung bei Sachurteilen in Zivilsachen symmetrisch sind, d. h. es ein ebenso schwerwiegender Fehler ist, einen bestehenden materiellrechtlichen Anspruch nicht zu schützen wie einen nicht bestehenden Anspruch durchzusetzen, ergibt sich ein optimales Beweismaß der überwiegenden Überzeugung für Sachverhaltsfeststellungen, die einem Sachurteil in Zivilsachen zugrunde liegen. Hingegen ist in Strafsachen weithin anerkannt, dass es ein schwerwiegender Fehler ist, einen Unschuldigen zu verurteilen, als einen Schuldigen freizusprechen,1 weshalb es sich rechtfertigt, die Entscheidungsgrenze in Strafsachen höher anzusetzen.

Beweiserleichterungen bei Beweisschwierigkeiten im schweizerischen Recht

Book Chapter
Mark Schweizer
Fellmann/Weber (Hrsg.), Haftpflichtprozess 2016, Zürich 2016, 121-151
Publication year: 2016

Loss Aversion, Omission Bias and the Civil Standard of Proof

Book Chapter
Mark Schweizer
Mathis (Hrsg.), European Perspectives on Behavioural Law and Economics, Heidelberg u.a. 2015, 125-145
Publication year: 2015

This article shows how insights from cognitive psychology, namely loss aversion, omission bias and status quo bias, explain the intuitive appeal of a standard of proof in civil cases that is considerably higher than the “preponderance of the evidence” or “balance of probabilities” standard employed by Common Law. These insights may explain the almost visceral rejection any suggestions lowering the standard of proof in civil matters have received in Germany. They do not, however, provide a normative basis for a standard of proof higher than 50% posterior subjective probability in civil cases.

Copyright: World Law and Practice: Chapter "Switzerland"

Book Chapter
Mark Schweizer, Reinhard Oertli
MacDonald/ Suthersanen/ Garrigues (eds.), Copyright: World Law and Practice, London 2004
Publication year: 2004

Country report for Switzerland.